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We present an epistemic logic equipped with time-stamps in the atoms and epistemic operators, which allows to reason
not only about information available to the different agents, but also about the moments at which events happen and new
knowledge is acquired or deduced. Our logic includes both an epistemic operator and a belief operator, which allows to
model the disclosure of information that may not be accurate.
Our main motivation is to model rich privacy policies in online social networks. Online Social Networks (OSNs) are
increasingly used for social interactions in the modern digital era, which bring new challenges and concerns in terms
of privacy. Most social networks today offer very limited mechanisms to express the desires of users in terms of how
information that affects their privacy is shared. In particular, most current privacy policy formalisms allow only static
policies, which are not rich enough to express timed properties like “my location after work should not be disclosed to
my boss”. The logic we present in this paper enables to express rich properties and policies in terms of the knowledge
available to the different users and the precise time of actions and deductions. Our framework can be instantiated for
different OSNs, by specifying the effect of the actions in the evolution of the social network and in the knowledge
disclosed to each agent.
We present an algorithm for deducing knowledge, which can also be instantiated with different variants of how the
epistemic information is preserved through time. Our algorithm allows to model not only social networks with eternal
information but also networks with ephemeral disclosures. Policies are modelled as formulae in the logic, which are
interpreted over timed traces representing the evolution of the social network.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks also known as Social Networking Sites, like Facebook [1], Twitter [5] and Snapchat [4]
have exploded in popularity in recent years. According to a recent survey [14] nearly 70% of the Internet
users are active on social networks.
Some concerns, including privacy, have arisen alongside this staggering increase in usage. Several stud-
ies [13, 15–17] report that privacy breaches are growing in number. Currently, the most popular social net-
works do not offer mechanisms that users can use to guarantee their desired privacy effectively. Moreover,
virtually all privacy policies are static and cannot express timing preferences, including referring to temporal
points explicitly and policies that evolve in time.
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In [21] we presented a privacy policy framework able to express dynamic privacy policies by introducing
an explicit learning operator and time intervals in the semantics of policies. The framework consists of a
knowledge based logic to characterise what users in the social network know, and a privacy policy language,
based on the previous logic, where users can limit who can know their information and when. Policies and
formulae in the logic are interpreted over social network models which faithfully represent the social graph
of OSNs. The policy language allows for the representation of recurrent privacy policies, .e.g., "During the
weekend only my friends can see my pictures". Note that the previous policy only requires to activate the
static policy "only my friends can see my pictures" during weekends.
Though quite expressive, a major restriction of the logic in [21] is that it does not have time, so one cannot
express different instants at which an event happens and when knowledge is acquired. Moreover, the logic
only includes a knowledge modality thus implicitly assuming that the information that users are told is true.
This assumption is, however, not realistic in social networks as users may also have beliefs given that not all
sources of information are truthful. Information that users disclose might be false. There exists a growing
interest in the detection of fake news [24–26].
To address this issues we propose to define a logic that: i) is tailored for social networks, i.e., allows for
expressing properties based on the social connections between users; ii) combines knowledge and belief
modalities to differentiate between beliefs that might be false and true knowledge; iii) has time-stamps in
modalities and atoms, thus enabling the possibility of referring to the time of information, e.g., a weekend
location, and the moment when it was learnt.
There exist already some logics that include these elements—but separately. One line of work studies
logics where the belief modality and atoms are time-stampted [27]. Unfortunately, this logic lacks of a
knowledgemodality, and is not tailored for social networks. Instead, it is defined to reason about AGM belief
revision, which is a more general setting than privacy in social networks. A logic to reason about how beliefs
spread out in Twitter has been introduced in [29]. This logic, though tailored for social networks, does not
include time-stamps, so it cannot be used for reasoning about time. Finally, [12] propose an axiomatisation
of epistemic logic which combines knowledge and belief, but again, it does not contain time-stamps in
modalities or atoms.
In this paper we leverage the insights from previous work to define a logic that combines knowledge,
belief and time and is tailored for the purpose of specifying dynamic privacy policies for social networks.
We refer the reader to Section 5 for a more detailed comparison of related works.
More concretely, we extend [21] by enriching the logic with explicit time instants, both in the atoms and
in the epistemic operators. In the resulting logic, one can refer to the instant at which some knowledge is
inferred, for example about the knowledge of another agent at another instant. The expressive power of the
new logic allows to derive the learning operator from the time-stamped knowledge.
Second, we equip the logic with belief operators, with the only restriction that agents cannot believe in
something that they know is false, and we define a belief propagation algorithmwhich guarantees that agents’
beliefs are always consistent. This allows the instantiation of the framework to OSNs where gossiping is
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allowed, that is, the spreading of potentially false information. Analogous to the learning operator, we derive
the accept operator as the moment in which an agent start believing in something.
Third, we introduce the notion of extended knowledge bases which allow to answer queries of (tempo-
ral) epistemic formulas against the knowledge acquired during a sequence of events. The algorithm uses
epistemic deductive reasoning starting from a set of axioms, which include the corresponding conventional
axioms of epistemic reasoning populated for all instants. Depending on the desired instantiation of the frame-
work, the axiom of perfect recall or weaker versions of it can be instantiated which allows to model knowl-
edge acquisition in eternal OSNs like Facebook and ephemeral OSNs like Snapchat. When weaker versions
are used, one can derive operators that capture when an agent stops knowing something (the forget operator)
or stops believing in something (the reject operator). Using extended knowledge bases we define the seman-
tics of the logic used to construct dynamic privacy policies. This provides the means for a particular OSNs to
enforce privacy policies, for example by blocking an event that would result in a violation of a user’s policy.
We illustrate with examples how our rich logic allows to express privacy policies and how agents can infer
knowledge in different instantiations of the framework.
Fourth, We prove that the model checking problem for this logic is decidable by providing a model check-
ing algorithm that is also used to check policy conformance. As a result, policy conformance is also decid-
able.
The purpose of this paper is to present an expressive foundation for developing algorithms for detecting
privacy violations and for privacy enforcement. We leave the discussion of specialized efficient algorihtms
for future work.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the framework and Section 3 introduces
the logic KBLRT . Section 4 shows how to express privacy policies using KBLRT . Section 4.0.1 shows
how different existing OSNs can be modeled within our framework, including Snapchat. Finally, Section 5
presents related work and Section 6 includes concluding remarks.
2 A TIMED PRIVACY POLICY FRAMEWORK
We introduce a formal privacy policy framework for OSNs where properties regarding users knowledge and
beliefs as well as time can be expressed. Our framework extends the framework in [21], in which temporal
properties were expressed using temporal operators ✷ and ✸. Our solution allows to describing properties
at concrete moments in time. We also introduce a modality for beliefs which allows to distinguish between
information that might be inaccurate.
Our framework, called PPF RT , consists of the following components:
(1) A timed epistemic logic, KBLRT , where modalities and predicates are timestamped.
(2) Extended social graphs, called social network models, which describe the state of the OSN. These
graphs contain the users or agents in the system and the relations between them, and their knowledge
and beliefs. We use SNRT to denote the universe of social network models, and use the notion of
trace of social network models to describe the evolution of the system.
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(3) A parameter ω ∈ N which determines for how long users remember information, e.g., 5 seconds,
24 hours or indefinitely. Users can acquire new believes that challenge their current knowledge and
believes, which requires a resolution. We illustrate this by a parameter β , with two possibilities
conservative or susceptible, which specifies how users behave when they learn new beliefs which
are inconsistent with their current beliefs.
(4) A privacy policy language based on the previous logic.
3 A TIMED KNOWLEDGE BASED LOGIC
KBLRT is a knowledge based first order logic which borrows modalities from epistemic logic [10], equips
modalities and predicates with time-stamps, and allows quantifiers over time-stamps.
3.1 Syntax
Let T be a vocabularywhich consists of a set of predicate symbols, function symbols, and constant symbols.
Predicate and functions symbols have some implicit arity. We assume an infinite supply of variables x ,y, . . ..
Terms of the elements of T can be built as s ::= c | x | f ( #»s ) where #»s is a tuple of terms respecting the arity
of f .
Let T denote a set of time-stamps, which is required to be a non-Zeno totally ordered set, that is, there is a
finite number of instants between any two given instants. We use time-stamps to mark pieces of information
or to query the knowledge of the agents at specific points in time. We consider Ag be a set of agents,D a set
of domains, and use EVT for set of events that can be executed in a social network. For instance, in Facebook,
users can share posts, upload pictures, like comments, etc. The set of events that users can perform depends
on the social network. Similarly, we use C and Σ to denote special sets of predicate symbols that denote
connections (between agents) and permissions. We introduce the syntax of KBLRT as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Syntax of KBLRT ). Given agents i, j ∈ Ag a time-stamp t ∈ T, an event e ∈ EVT , a
variable x , a domain D ∈ D, predicate symbols ctc (i, j),a
t
a(i, j),p
t ( #»s ) where c ∈ C and a ∈ Σ, the syntax of
the real-time knowledge-based logic KBLRT is inductively defined as:
φ ::= ρ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | ∀t · φ | ∀x : D · φ | K ti φ | B
t
iφ
ρ ::= ctc (i, j) | c
t
a (i, j) | p
t ( #»s ) | occurredt (e)
Given a nonempty set of agents G ⊆ Ag, the additional epistemic modalities are defined StGφ ,
∨
i ∈G K
t
i φ,
Et
G
φ ,
∧
i ∈G K
t
i φ.
The epistemic modalities stand for: K ti φ, agent i knows φ at time t ; S
t
G
φ, someone in the groupG knows
φ at time t ; Et
G
φ, everyone in the group G knows φ at time t . We use the following notation as syntactic
sugar P ji a
t , a(i, j, t ) , meaning that “agent i is permitted to execute action a to agent j”. For example,
PAlice
Bob
friendRequest5 means that Bob is allowed to send a friend request to Alice at time 5. We will use
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FKBLRT to denote the set of all well-formedKBLRT formulae. The syntax introduces the following novel
notions that have not been considered in other formal privacy policies languages such as [8, 11, 18, 21].
Time-stamped Predicates. Time-stamps are explicit in each predicate, including connections and actions.
A time-stamp attached to a predicate captures those moment in time when that particular predicate holds.
For instance, if Alice and Bob were friends in a certain time period, then the predicate friendt (Alice, Bob) is
true for all t falling into the period, and false for all t outside. This can be seen as the valid time in temporal
databases [23].
Separating Knowledge and Belief. Not all the information that users see in a social network is true. For
instance, Alice may tell Bob that she will be working until late, whereas she will actually go with her
colleagues to have some beers. In this example, Bob has the (false) belief that Alice is working.
Traditionally, in epistemic logic, the knowledge of agents consists on true facts. Potentially false informa-
tion is regarded as beliefs [10]. The set of axioms S5 characterise knowledge and the axioms of KD45 char-
acterise belief [10]. ForKBLRT we combine both notions in one logic. In the following section we describe
how to combine these two axiomatisations based on the results proposed by Halpern et al. in [12].
Time-stamped Epistemic Modalities. Time-stamps are also part of the epistemic modalitiesK and B . Using
time-stamps we can refer to the knowledge and beliefs of the agents at different points in time. For example,
the meaning of the formula B20:00
Bob
loc19:00(Alice,work) is that Bob beliefs at 20: 00 that Alice’s location at
19: 00 is work.
Occurrence of Events. It is important to be able to determine when an event has occurred. Such an expres-
sive power allows users to define policies that are activated whenever someone performs an undesired event.
Examples of these policies are: “if Alice unfriends Bob, she is not allowed to send Bob a friend request” or
“if a Alice denies an invitation to Bob’s party, then she cannot see any of the pictures uploaded during the
party.”
Here we introduce occurredt (e) to be able to syntactically capture the moment when a specific event e
occurred. A similar predicate was introduced by Moses et al. in [6] for analysing communication protocols.
3.2 Semantics
3.2.1 Real-Time Social Network Models. We introduce formal models which allow us to reason
about specific social network states at a given moment in time. These models leverage the information in the
social graph [9]—the core data model in most social networks [2, 3, 7]. Social graphs include the users (or
agents) and the relationships between them. Moreover, in our models we include a knowledge base for each
agent, and the set of privacy policies that they have activated. We reuse the models defined for the previous
version of this framework [21]. Nevertheless, the expressiveness of the privacy policies that can be enforced
in PPF RT have substantially increased (see Section 4).
Definition 3.2 (Social Network Models). Given a set of formulae F ⊆ FKBLRT , a set of privacy policies
Π, and a finite set of agents Ag ⊆ AU from a universe AU, a social network model (SNM) is a tuple
〈Ag,A,KB, π 〉, where
6 R. Pardo et al.
• Ag is a nonempty finite set of nodes representing the agents in the social network;
• A is a first-order structure over the SNM. As usual, it consists of a set of domains, and a set relations,
functions and constants interpreted over their corresponding domain.
• KB : Ag → 2F is a function retrieving a set of knowledge of an agent—each piece with an associated
time-stamp. The set corresponds to the facts stored in the knowledge base of the agent; we write KBi . for
KB(i);
• π : Ag → 2Π is a function returning the set of privacy policies of each agent; we write πi for π (i).
In Def. 3.2, the shape of the relational structure A depends on the type of the social network under con-
sideration. We represent the connections—edges of the social graph—and the permission actions between
social network agents, as families of binary relations, respectively {Ci }i ∈C ⊆ Ag×Ag and {Ai }i ∈Σ ⊆ Ag×Ag
over the domain of agents. We use {Di }i ∈D to denote the set of domains. The set of agents Ag is always
included in the set of domains. We use C,Σ and D to denote sets of connections, permissions and domains,
respectively.
3.2.2 Evolution of Social Network Models. The state of a social network changes by means of the
execution of events. For instance, in Facebook, users can share posts, upload pictures, like comments, etc.
The set of events that users can perform depends on the social network. We denote the set of events that can
be executed in a social network as EVT . We use traces to capture the evolution of the social network. Each
element of the trace is a tuple containing: a social network model, a set of events, and a time-stamp.
Definition 3.3 (Trace). Given k ∈ N, a trace σ is a finite sequence
σ = 〈(SN 0, E0, t0), (SN 1, E1, t1), . . . , (SNk , Ek , tk )〉
such that, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, SN i ∈ SNRT , Ei ⊆ EVT , and ti ∈ T.
We define Tσ = {t | (SN , E, t ) ∈ σ } to be the set of all the time-stamps of σ . We impose some conditions
to traces so that they accurately model the evolution of social networks. We say that a trace is well-formed if
it satisfies the following conditions:
Ordered time-stamps. Time-stamps are strictly ordered from smallest to largest.
Accounting for Events. The definition has to account for events being explicit in the trace. Let −→ be a
transition relation defined as −→ ⊆ SNRT × 2EVT × T × SNRT . We have 〈SN 1, E, t , SN 2〉 ∈ −→ if SN 2 is the
result of the set of events E ∈ EVT happening in SN 1 at time t . Note that we allow E to be empty, in which
case SN 2 = SN 1. We will use the more compact notation of SN 1
E,t
−−→ SN 2 where appropriate.
Events are independent. For each
E,t
−−→ the set of events E must only contain independent events. Two
events are independent if, when executed sequentially, the execution order does not change their behaviour.
Consider the events: post(Charlie, Bob, ”London”) (Charlie shares a post containing Bob’s location), and
friendRequest(Alice,Charlie) (Alice sends a friend request to Charlie). Independently of the order in which
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the previous events are executed the resulting SNM will have a new post by Bob, and Charlie will receive a
friend request fromAlice. On the other hand, consider now: post(Charlie, Bob, “London′′) and disallowLoc(Bob)
(Bob activates a privacy policywhich forbids anyone to disclose his location). In this case, if post(Charlie, Bob, “London′′)
is executed first, the resulting SNM will contain the post by Charlie including Bob’s location. However, if
disallowLoc(Bob) occurs before post(Charlie, Bob, “London′′), Charlie’s post would be blocked—since it vio-
lates Bob’s privacy policy. These two events are not independent.
More formally,
Definition 3.4. Given two events e1, e2 ∈ EVT , we say that e1 and e2 are independent iff for any two traces
σ1 and σ2
σ1 = SN
0
1
{e1 },t
−−−−→ SN 11
{e2 },t
′
−−−−−→ SN 21
σ2 = SN
0
2
{e2 },t
−−−−→ SN 12
{e1 },t
′
−−−−−→ SN 22
it holds SN 01 = SN
0
2 and SN
2
1 = SN
2
2.
We can now provide a formal definition of well-formed SNM traces.
Definition 3.5 (Well-Formed Trace). Let
σ = 〈(SN 0, E0, t0), (SN 1, E1, t1), . . . , (SNk , Ek , tk )〉
be a trace. σ is well-formed if the following conditions hold:
(1) For any i, j such that 0 ≤ i < j ≤ k it follows that ti < tj .
(2) For all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, it is the case that SN i
Ei+1, ti+1
−−−−−−→ SN i+1.
(3) For all e1, e2 ∈ Ei for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, e1 is independent from e2.
We will use TCS to refer to the set of all well-formed PPF RT traces. In order to be able to syntactically
refer to the previous or next social network model, given a concrete time-stamp, we assume that there exist
the functions predecessor (pred) and next (next). pred : T→ T takes a time-stamp and returns the previous
time-stamp in the trace. Since the set of time-stamps is non-Zeno it is always possible to compute the
previous time-stamp. Analogously, next : T→ T takes a time-stamp and returns the next time-stamp in the
trace. In 〈(SN 0, E0, t0), (SN 1, E1, t1), (SN 2, E2, t2)〉, pred(t1) = t0 and next(t1) = t2. We define predecessor of
the initial time-stamp to be equal to itsel, i.e., pred(t0) = t0. Similarly, next of the last time-stamp of the trace
is equal to itself, i.e., next(t2) = t2.
3.2.3 Modelling knowledge. It is not a coincidence that KBLRT formulae look very similar to those
of the language Ln originally defined for epistemic logic [10]. We would like to provide users in our system
with the same notion of knowledge. Traditionally, in epistemic logic, the way to model and give semantics
to Kiφ is by means of an undistinguishability relation which connects all world that an agent considers
possible [10]. In particular, when talking about traces of events the framework used is Interpreted Systems
(ISs). In ISs traces are called runs. A run describes the state of the system at any point in (discrete) time. An
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IS I is composed by a set of runs and a undistinguishability relation (∼i )—for each agent i—which models
the states of the system that agents consider possible at any point in time. Determining whether an agent i
knows a formula φ (written in the language of epistemic logic), for a run r at timem is defined as follows:
(I, r ,m) |= Kiφ iff (I, r ′,m′) |= φ for all (r ,m) ∼i (r ′,m′)
where (r ,m) and (r ′,m′) represent states of I.
Additionally, Fagin et al. proposed an alternative encoding to answer epistemic queries from a knowledge
base consisting in a set of accumulated facts [10][Section 7.3]. Let kb be an agent representing a knowledge
base that has been told the facts 〈ψ1, . . . ,ψk 〉 for k ≥ 1 in run r at time t . It was shown in [10][Theorem
7.3.1] that the following are equivalent:
a) (Ikb, r ,m) |= Kkbφ.
b) Mrstn |= Kkb(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ψk ) =⇒ Kkbφ.
c) (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ψk ) =⇒ φ is a tautology.
where Ikb is an IS which models the behaviour of kb andMrstn |= φ means that φ is valid in the Kripke
models with an accessibility relation that is reflexive (r), symmetric (s) and transitive (t). The previous
theorem holds not only for a system consisting in a single knowledge base, but systems including several
knowledge bases.
This way of modelling knowledge is very suitable for our social network models. As mentioned earlier, in
a social network model the users’ knowledge is stored in their knowledge base. Therefore, by using the equiv-
alence in [10][Theorem 7.3.1] we can determine whether a user knows a formula φ from the conjunction of
all the formulae it has been told, formally,
∧
ψ ∈KBi ψ =⇒ φ.
However, as mentioned earlier, KBLRT is not the same language as Ln . Therefore we cannot directly
apply [10][Theorem 7.3.1] to determine whether a user knows a fact φ. In the following we described an
extended knowledge base which supports all the components of KBLRT .
3.2.4 Extended Knowledge Bases. An Extended Knowledge Base (EKB) consists in a collection
KBLRT formulae without quantifiers. All domains in a SNM are finite at a given point in time—the might
grow as events occur. On the one hand, regular domains, i.e.,Dt inA are assumed to be finite. Therefore, they
can be easily unfolded as a finite conjunction. On the other hand, the time-stamps domain—though infinite
in general—for a given trace Tσ will be finite because traces are finite. Hence EKBs can be populated with
the explicit time-stamps values that moment in time. Later in this section, we introduce some axioms which
will define how time-stamps are handled. In what follows we introduce the axioms EKBs use to handle
knowledge and belief.
Derivations in EKBs. The information stored in an agent’s EKBs along a trace determines her knowledge.
At a concrete moment in time, an agent’s EKB contains the explicit knowledge she just learnt. New knowl-
edge can be derived from the explicit pieces of information in agents’ EKBs. Derivations are not limited
to formulae of a given point in time, but also can use old knowledge. A time window, or simply, window,
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determines how much old knowledge is included in a derivation. We write Γ ⊢ (φ,w) to denote that φ can be
derived from Γ given a windoww . We provide a set of deduction rules, DR, of the form
Γ ⊢ (φ,w ′)
Γ ⊢ (ψ ,w)
meaning that, given the set of premises Γ,ψ can be derived with a windoww from φ in a windoww ′.
Definition 3.6. A timed derivation of a formula φ ∈ FKBL given a windoww ∈ N, is a finite sequence of
pairs of formulae and windows, FKBL × N, such that (φ1,w1), (φ2,w2), . . . , (φn ,wn) = (φ,w) where each φi ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, follows from previous steps by an application of a deduction rule of DR which premises have
already been derived, i.e., it appears as φ j with j < i, andw j ≤ wi .
In what follows we present the concrete derivation rules that can be used in EKBs to derive knowledge.
We define deduction rules based on well studied axiomatisations of knowledge and belief together with rules
to deal with knowledge propagation.
Knowledge and Belief in EKBs. In EKBs knowledge and belief coexist. So far, the definition of knowledge
that we provided in the previous section only takes into account the axioms for knowledge. In particular, the
axiomatisation S5. Thus, EKBs can use any of the S5 axioms to derive new knowledge from the conjunction
of explicit facts in the knowledge base.
Fagin et al. provided an axiomatisation for belief [10], the KD45 axiomatisation. It includes the same
set of axioms as S5 —replacing Ki by Bi—except for the axiom Kiφ =⇒ φ (A3). The difference be-
tween knowledge and belief is that believes do not need to be true—as required by A3 in knowledge. The
requirement is that an agent must have consistent beliefs. It is encoded in the following axiom ¬Bi⊥ (axiom
D).
We can summarise the last two paragraphs as follows:Whenever a formula of the formKiφ is encountered,
axioms from S5 can be applied to derive new knowledge, and if the formula is of the form Biφ axioms from
KD45 can be used instead. Nonetheless, we are missing an important issue: How do knowledge and belief
relate to each other? To answer this question we use two axioms proposed by Halpern et al. in [12]: (L1)
Kiφ =⇒ Biφ and (L2) Biφ =⇒ KiBiφ.
L1 expresses that when users know a fact they also believe it. It is sound with respect to the definition
of both modalities, since knowledge is required to be true by definition (recall axiom A3). This axiom
provides a way to convert knowledge to belief. L2 encodes that when agents believe a fact φ they know that
they believe φ. Thus adding an axiom which introduces knowledge from belief—more precisely, introduces
knowledge about the beliefs.
However, the axioms from S5, KD45 and L1, L2 need to be adapted toKBLRT syntax—which is the type
of formulae supported by EKBs. In particular, the modalities need a time-stamp. All these axiomatisations
are defined for models which represent the system in a concrete time. That is, given the current set of facts
that users have, they can apply the axioms to derive new knowledge (at that time). To preserve this notion we
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Knowledge axioms Belief axioms Knowledge-Belief axioms
A1 All tautologies of first-order logic K Btiφ ∧ B
t
i (φ =⇒ ψ ) =⇒ B
t
iψ L1 K
t
i φ =⇒ B
t
iφ
A2 K ti φ ∧K
t
i (φ =⇒ ψ ) =⇒ K
t
iψ D ¬B
t
i⊥ L2 B
t
iφ =⇒ K
t
i B
t
iφ
A3 K ti φ =⇒ φ B4 B
t
iφ =⇒ B
t
i B
t
iφ
A4 K ti φ =⇒ K
t
i K
t
i φ B5 ¬B
t
iφ =⇒ B
t
i¬B
t
iφ
A5 ¬K ti φ =⇒ K
t
i ¬K
t
i φ
Table 1. EKB axioms for a trace σ for each t ∈ Tσ .
Knowledge deduction rules axioms
φ is a first-order tautology
Γ ⊢ (φ,w)
(A1)
Γ ⊢ (K ti φ,w) Γ ⊢ (K
t
i (φ =⇒ ψ ),w)
Γ ⊢ (K tiψ ,w)
(A2)
Γ ⊢ (K ti φ,w)
Γ ⊢ (φ,w)
(A3)
Γ ⊢ (K ti φ,w)
Γ ⊢ (K ti K
t
i φ,w)
(A4)
Γ ⊢ (¬K ti φ,w)
Γ ⊢ (K ti ¬K
t
i φ,w)
(A5)
Belief deduction rules
Γ ⊢ (Btiφ,w)
Γ ⊢ (Bti (φ =⇒ ψ ),w)
Γ ⊢ (Btiψ ,w)
(K)
Γ ⊢ (¬Bti⊥,w)
(D)
Γ ⊢ (Btiφ,w)
Γ ⊢ (Bti B
t
iφ,w)
(B4)
Γ ⊢ (¬Btiφ,w)
Γ ⊢ (Bti¬B
t
iφ,w)
(B5)
Premise deduction rule Knowledge-Belief deduction rules
φ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ (φ,w)
(PREMISE)
Γ ⊢ (K ti φ,w)
Γ ⊢ (Btiφ,w)
(L1)
Γ ⊢ (Btiφ,w)
Γ ⊢ (K ti B
t
iφ,w)
(L2)
Table 2. EKB deduction rules for a trace σ for each t ∈ Tσ .
will simply add the time-stamp t to all modalities. Intuitively, it models that if users have some knowledge
at time t they can derive knowledge using the previous axioms, and, this derived knowledge, belongs to
the same time t . Table 1 shows the complete list of axioms that can be applied given a trace σ for each
time-stamps t ∈ Tσ .
In order for these axioms to be used in timed derivations we now express them as deduction rules as shown
in Table 2. Since all derivations are performed for the same t they all share the same windoww .
As mentioned earlier, an EKB models the knowledge and beliefs of a user at a given moment in time. We
encode this notion by adding an explicit K ti to every formula in a user’s EKB. Formally, we say that users in
a trace σ are self-aware iff for all t ∈ Tσ If φ ∈ EKB
σ [t ]
i then φ = K
t
i φ
′. By assuming this property we can
syntactically determine the time t when some knowledge φ enters an EKB. In what follows we assume that
all well-formed traces are composed by self-aware agents.
Example 3.7. Consider the following EKB from a trace σ of an agent i at time t .
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K ti (∀t
′ · ∀j:Agt
′
· eventt
′
(j, pub) =⇒ loct
′
(j, pub))
K ti event
t (Alice, pub)
EKB
σ [t ]
i
In this EKB i can derive using the axioms in Table 1 that Alice’s location at time t is a pub, i.e.,
loct
′
(Alice, pub). Here we show the steps to derive this piece of information. We recall that quantifiers are
unfolded when added to the knowledge base. Therefore, given Tσ = {t0, t1, . . . , t}
K ti ∀j:Ag
t0 · eventt0 (j, pub) =⇒ loct0 (j, pub) ∧
K ti ∀j:Ag
t1 · eventt1 (j, pub) =⇒ loct1 (j, pub) ∧
. . .
K ti ∀j:Ag
t · eventt (j, pub) =⇒ loct (j, pub)
where each of these are also syntactic sugar, for instance, given Agt = {j1, j2, . . . , jn} for n ∈ N
K ti event
t (j1, pub) =⇒ loc
t (j1, pub) ∧
K ti event
t (j2, pub) =⇒ loc
t (j2, pub) ∧
. . .
K ti event
t (jn, pub) =⇒ loc
t (jn, pub)
The predicate eventt (j, pub) means that j attended an event at time t in a pub. The predicate loct (j) means
that j’s location is a pub. Thus, the implication above encodes that if i’s knows at t that if an agent is attending
an event in a pub at time t , her location will be a pub. Moreover, i knows at time t that Alice is attending
an event at the pub, eventt (Alice, pub). As mentioned earlier, in epistemic logic, knowledge is required to
be true. Therefore, eventt (Alice, pub) must be a true predicate. From this we can infer that Alice ∈ Agt .
Because of this, K ti event
t (Alice, pub) =⇒ loct (Alice, pub) must also be present in EKBσ [t ]i . Applying A2 to
K ti event
t (Alice, pub) and the previous implication we can derive K ti loc
t ′ (j, pub) as required. 
Handling time-stamps. In EKBs users can also reason about time. For instance, if Alice learns Bob’s
birthday she will remember this piece of information, possibly, forever. Nonetheless, this is not always
true, some information is transient, i.e., it can change over time. Imagine that Alice shares a post including
her location with Bob. Right after posting, Bob will know Alice’s location—assuming she said the truth.
However, after a few hours, Bob will not know for sure whether Alice remains in the same location. The
most he can tell is that Alice was a few hours before in that location or that he believes that Alice’s location
is the one she shared. We denote the period of time in which some piece of information remains true as
duration.
Different pieces of information might have different durations. For example, someone’s birthday never
changes, but locations constantly change. Duration also depends on the OSN. In Snapchat messages last
10 seconds, in Whatsapp status messages last 24 hours and in Facebook posts remain forever unless a user
removes them. Due to these dependences we do not fix a concrete set of properties regarding time-stamps.
Instead we keep it open so that they can be added when modelling concrete OSNs in PPF RT . Concretely,
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the parameterω introduced at the beginning of Section 2 corresponds to information duration for a particular
OSN modelled in PPF RT .
Using the window w—from timed derivations, see Def. 3.6—we define the following deduction rule
encoding knowledge propagation. Given t , t ′ ∈ Tσ where t < t ′:
Γ ⊢ (K ti φ,w − (t
′ − t ))
Γ ⊢ (K t
′
i φ,w)
(KR1)
The intuition behind KR1 is that w is consumed every time knowledge is propagated. Imagine that Alice
knows at time 1 the formula φ, K1
Alice
φ. Using KR1 in a derivation would allow us to derive, for instance,
that she knows φ at a later time, e.g., at time 5, that is, K5
Alice
φ. Note that this derivation requires w to be at
least 4, since Alice’s knowledge of φ is propagated 4 units of time. As usual in when using this type rules,
derivations can be described forwards or backwards. In the latter, the derivation starts with the conclusion of
the rule—that is, we want to derive—and reduce the value of w every time we access old knowledge. In the
former, we start from the premise of the rule and we increase w accordingly to derive the conclusion. The
intuition and ways of deriving knowledge using KR1 are better illustrated with an example.
Example 3.8. Consider the sequence of EKBs in Fig. 1 of an agent i from a trace σ where Tσ = {0, . . . , 4}.
In this example we show the purpose of the windoww when making derivations. Note that it is not possible
to derive Alice’s location only from the set of facts in a single knowledge base at a time t . Instead it is
required to combine knowledge from different knowledge bases. We use the knowledge recall rule with
different windows to access previous knowledge. As mentioned earlier, intuitively, w determines for how
long agents remember information. Therefore, it is required to find an appropriate value forw that includes
the sufficient knowledge—from all moments in time—to perform the derivation. In the figure, the red square
marks the accessible knowledge forw = 2 and the blue square forw = 3.
As can be seen in the trace, in order for i to derive event3(Alice, pub) she needs to combine knowledge
from EKBσ [0]i and EKB
σ [3]
i . Let EKB
σ
i =
⋃
t ∈Tσ EKB
σ [t ]
i . First, we show how to construct a proof forwards,
i.e., starting from the premises and a window of 0, move forward—by increasing the size of w—until the
inference can be performed. In particular, we show that EKBσi ⊢ (K
3
loc3(Alice,pub)
,w) forw ∈ N. Let us start by
applying the rule PREMISE withw = 0,
EKBσi ⊢ (K
0
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 0)
Recall that the quantifiers in the example are just syntactic sugar. They are replaced when added to the
EKB. Now we use KR1 to combine this knowledge with knowledge at time 3. In other words, we propagate
knowledge from time 0 (K0i ) to time 3 (K
3
i ).
(KR1)
EKBσi ⊢ (K
0
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 0)
EKBσi ⊢ (K
3
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 3)
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K0i ∀t
′ · ∀j :Agt
′
· eventt
′
(j, pub) =⇒ loct
′
(j, pub)
EKB
σ [0]
i
∅
EKB
σ [1]
i
∅
EKB
σ [2]
i
K3i event
3(Alice, pub)
EKB
σ [3]
i
∅
EKB
σ [4]
i
Fig. 1. Sequence of EKBs of agent i for a trace σ where Tσ = {0, . . . , 4}
As stated in the rule the window has been incresed by 3, since 0 = 3 − (3 − 0). We apply PREMISE again to
obtain (EKBσi ⊢ K
3
i event
3(Alice, pub), 3). As in Example 3.7 by applying A2 in the previous statements we
derive (EKBσi ⊢ K
3
i loc
3(Alice, pub), 3). This proof shows that i knows Alices location provided that agents
remember information during 3 units of time.
We show now that a window smaller than 3 makes this derivation impossible. Also we construct the proof
backwards, i.e., starting from the conclusion we try to prove the required premises. Let us take a largest
window smaller than 3,w = 2. We try to show that EKBσi ⊢ (K
3
i loc
3(Alice, pub), 2). In order to prove we need
to show the following:
(A2)
(EKBσi ⊢ K
3
i event
3(Alice, pub), 2) EKBσi ⊢ (K
3
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 2)
EKBσi ⊢ (K
3
i loc
3(Alice, pub), 2)
The first premise, (EKBσi ⊢ K
3
i event
3(Alice, pub), 2), trivally follows by PREMISE. For the second premise we
first try move one step back using KR1, i.e,
EKBσi ⊢ (K
2
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 1),
since there is no knowledge at time 2, the previous statement cannot be proven. We apply again KR1 obtain-
ing
EKBσi ⊢ (K
1
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub), 0).
Similarly, this statement cannot be proven. Note that the window is 0. Intuitively, it means that we have
access all knowledge that i remembers. Therefore, we have reach a dead end in our proof tree. KR1 could
be applied again, which would give
EKBσi ⊢ (K
1
i event
3(Alice, pub) =⇒ loc3(Alice, pub),−1).
However, it would not be a valid timed derivation. In Def. 3.6 we requirew ∈ N. Finally, we conclude that
K3i loc
3(Alice, pub) cannot be derived with a window of 2. 
Belief propagation. Beliefs cannot be propagated as easily as knowledge because new beliefs may con-
tradict current knowledge or beliefs of an agent. Instead of using timed derivations, we model agents that
try to propagate beliefs if these beliefs are consistent, and discard them otherwise. We describe two kinds of
agents: conservative and susceptible, but other criteria for choosing between incompatible beliefs are pos-
sible. We use the parameter β in the framework to denote the kind of agent. Conservative agents reject any
new belief that contradicts their current set of beliefs, while susceptible agents always accept new beliefs that
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replace old believes if necessary to guarantee a consistent set of beliefs. Here we present a belief propagation
algorithm which describes how agents behave when faced with a new belief.
Consider a trace σ with Tσ = {t0, . . . , tn−1, tn}. We use the following notation EKB
σ [tj,tk ]
i =
⋃
t ∈{tj , ...,tk } EKB
σ [t ]
i .
Also, we introduce the event enter(Btiφ) meaning that belief φ enters i’s knowledge base at time t . The
moment at which this event occurs identifies the moment when a belief is inserted in an agent’s knowl-
edge base, which is crucial to propagate beliefs. Given a belief Btni φ that is about to enter EKB
σ [tn ]
i , i.e.,
SN tn−1
enter(B
tn
i φ),tn
−−−−−−−−−−−→ SN tn , Algorithm 1 propagates the accumulated set of beliefs as long as they are inside
the window ω, and resolves conflicts according to β .
Lines 2-3 of Algorithm 1 construct a set Ψ of candidate beliefs to be propagated—according to ω—
together with the new belief that tries to enter i’s EKB. The if block (lines 4-6) sorts Ψ according to β . In
the foreach block (lines 7-11), we iterate over the sorted list of beliefs and add them to EKBσ [tn ]i if they are
consistent with the rest of knowledge and beliefs. It is easy to see that traversing beliefs from newest to oldest
gives preference to newer beliefs in entering EKBσ [tn ]i . In particular, B
tn
i φ—the newest belief—will always
enter the EKBσ [tn ]i unless this belief contradicts actual knowledge, which corresponds to susceptible agents.
On the contrary, when sorting from oldest to newest, the older beliefs will have preference to enter EKBσ [tn ]i ,
thus, preventing new inconsistent beliefs to enter EKBσ [tn ]i , as required for conservative agents. In particular,
B
tn
i φ will not be added to EKB
σ [tn ]
i unless it is consistent with all the previous beliefs and knowledge. Finally,
we always include the predicate occurredtn (enter(Btni φ)) (line 12) so that the agent remembers that she was
told Btni φ —independently on whether she started to believe it. Note that consistency of EKB
σ [tn ]
i in both
cases is directly guaranteed by the inclusion condition in line 8.
Algorithm 1 Belief propagation
1: procedure BELIEF-PROPAGATION(EKBσ [tn ]i , B
tn
i φ, ω, β)
2: Ψ← {K tni B
tn
i ψ |occurred
t (enter(Btiφ)) ∈ EKB
σ [tn−ω,tn]
i where t ∈ [tn − ω, tn]}
3: Ψ← Ψ ∪ {K tni B
tn
i φ}
4: if β = susceptible then [b0,b1, . . . ,bn]← sortNewestOldest (Ψ)
5: else if β = conservative then [b0,b1, . . . ,bn]← sortOldestNewest (Ψ)
6: end if
7: foreach b in [b0,b1, . . . ,bn] do
8: if EKB
σ [t0,tn ]
i ∪ {b} ✁⊢ B
tn
i ⊥ then
9: EKB
σ [tn ]
i ← EKB
σ [tn ]
i ∪ {b}
10: end if
11: end foreach
12: EKB
σ [tn ]
i ← EKB
σ [tn ]
i ∪ {occurred
tn (enter(Btni φ))}
13: return EKB
σ [tn]
i
14: end procedure
Example 3.9. At 20: 00Alice sends a message to Bob indicating that she is at work, so EKBσ [20:00]
Bob
contains
occurred20:00(enter(B20:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice,work))) and also K20:00
Bob
B20:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice,work). At 22: 00 Bob checks
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σ |= occurredt (e) iff (SN , E, t ) ∈ σ such that e ∈ E
σ |= ¬φ iff σ ✁|= φ
σ |= φ ∧ψ iff σ |= φ and σ |= ψ
σ |= ∀t · φ iff for all v ∈ Tσ , σ |= φ[v/t]
σ |= ∀x : Dt · φ iff for all v ∈ Dσ [t ]o , σ |= φ[v/x]
σ |= ctm (i, j) iff (i, j) ∈ C
σ [t ]
m
σ |= atn (i, j) iff (i, j) ∈ A
σ [t ]
n
σ |= pt #»s iff pt #»s ∈ KBσ [t ]e
σ |= K ti φ iff
⋃
{t ′ |t ′<t,t ′∈Tσ } KB
σ [t ′]
i ⊢ (φ,ω)
σ |= Btiφ iff
⋃
{t ′ |t ′<t,t ′∈Tσ } KB
σ [t ′]
i ⊢ (B
t
iφ,ω)
Fig. 2. Satisfaction relation for KBLRT
his Facebook timeline, and he sees a post of Charlie—who is a coworker of Alice—at 20: 00 saying that
he is with all his coworkers in a pub having a beer. Assuming that at 22: 00 Bob still remembers his belief
from 20: 00 this new information creates a conflict with Bob’s beliefs. Note that information from Charlie’s
post is also taken as a belief since there is no way for Bob to validate it. If Bob is a conservative agent, then
EKB
σ [22:00]
Bob
= {K22:00
Bob
B22:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice,work)} ∪ {occurred22:00(enter(B22:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice, pub)))},meaning
that the new belief is rejected. If Bob is a susceptible agent: EKBσ [22:00]
Bob
= {K22:00
Bob
B22:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice, pub)}
∪ {occurred22:00(enter(B22:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice, pub)))}. Bob believes that Alice’s location at time t (20: 00 ≤ t <
22: 00) is work—due to belief propagation. After 22: 00, this belief does not propagate to avoid contradictions
with the new belief B22:00
Bob
loc20:00(Alice, pub). 
3.2.5 Semantics ofKBLRT (RTKBL). The semantics ofKBLRT formulae is given by the following
satisfaction relation .
Definition 3.10 (Satisfaction Relation). Given a well-formed trace σ ∈ TCS, agents i, j ∈ Ag, a finite set
of agents G ⊆ Ag, formulae φ,ψ ∈ FKBLRT ,m ∈ C, n ∈ Σ, o ∈ D, a variable x , an event e ∈ EVT , and a
time-stamp t , the satisfaction relation |= ⊆ TCS × FKBLRT is defined as shown in Fig. 2.
Predicates of type occurredt (e) are true if the event e is part of the events that occurred at time t in
the trace. ∀t quantifies over all the time-stamps in the trace Tσ , which, as mentioned earlier, is a finite
set. For the remaining domains, ∀x : Dt , the substitution is carried out over the elements of the domain
at a concrete time t . Remember that each individual domian Dt always contains a finite set of elements.
However, the same domain at different points in time, e.g., Dt and Dt
′
, for any t 6= t ′ might contain different
number of elements. When checking connections ctm (i, j) and actions a
t
n (i, j) at time t , we check whether the
corresponding relation—Cσ [t ]m andA
σ [t ]
n , correspondingly—of the SNM at time t contains the pair of users in
question. Checking whether a predicate of typept #»s holds is equivalent to looking into the knowledge base of
the environment at time t . The environment’s knowledge base contains all predicates that are true in the real
world at a given moment in time. For example, “it is raining in Gothenburg at 19:00” rain19:00(Gothenburg)
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K0
Alice
picture0(Bob, pub)
K0
Alice
B0
Alice
loc0(Bob, pub)
Alice
Bob
Charlie
SN 0
K7
Alice
friendRequest7(Alice, Charlie) Alice
Bob
K7
Charlie
friendRequest7(Alice, Charlie) Charlie
SN 7
K15
Alice
picture15(Bob, work)
K15
Alice
B15
Alice
loc15(Bob, work)
Alice
K15
Bob
picture15(Bob, work)
K15
Bob
loc15(Bob, work)
Bob
Charlie
SN 15
Friendship
friendRequest
Friendship
friendRequest
Friendship
Friendship
{friendRequest(Alice, Charlie)}, 7
{acceptFollowReq(Alice, Charlie),
share(picture, Bob, work)}, 15
Fig. 3. Example of a Snapchat trace
or “Alice’s location at 20:00 is Madrid” loc20:00(Alice,Madrid). Determining whether an agent i knows φ at
time t , K ti φ, translates to checking whether φ can be derived from i’s knowledge base at time t . In order to
determine whether a user believes φ at time t , Btiφ, we check whether B
t
iφ is derivable from the knowledge
base of the user at time t given the parameter ω of the framework. This way of defining belief is based on
the fact that agents are aware of their beliefs, recall axiom (L2) in Table 1. Therefore if a user believes φ, i.e.,
Btiφ, then she must also know that she believes it K
t
i B
t
iφ. Intuitively, KB
σ [t ]
i ⊢ φ means that “user i knows
φ at time t”, given its equivalence to the knowledge operator. As expected, knowledge derivations are also
limited by the parameter ω.
The intuition behind the previous definitions is better illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.11 (Snapchat). In this example we model the OSN Snapchat. In Snapchat there are two main
events that users can perform: i) Connect through a friend relation; ii) share timed messages (which last
up to 10 seconds and can include text and/or a picture) with their friends. Fig. 3 shows an example trace
for Snapchat. The trace consists of: A common set of agents Ag = {Alice, Bob,Charlie}. Since Ag does not
change we avoid using the superindex indicating the time-stamp of the domain. Three SNMs SN 0, SN 7 and
SN 15. The subindex of the SNMs indicates their time-stamp.
At time 0, Alice and Bob are friends, i.e., friendship0(Alice, Bob). This is represented by including the
pair (Alice, Bob) in the relation Friendshipσ [0], drawn in the picture as an arrow between Alice and Bob
in SN 0. This relation between Alice and Bob does not change in σ . Moreover, in SN 0, Alice can send
a friend request to Charlie. It is depicted as an outgoing dashed arrow from Alice’s node to Charlie’s.
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Thus, σ |= PCharlie
Alice
friendRequest0 holds. Moreover, Alice knows that there is a picture of Bob at the pub,
picture0(Bob, pub). On the other hand, she believes that his location is the pub, loc0(Bob, pub). The reason for
this is because she cannot verify that the picture has not been modified or she cannot precisely identify the
location. However, the existence of picture0(Bob, pub) can be verified since it is a picture that Alice can see
in the OSN.
At time 7, Alice sends a friend request to Charlie. Though in this paper we do not discuss modelling the
behaviour of events, we assume for this example that Alice can perform this events since he is explicitly
permitted.1 After the execution of the event both agents know friendRequest7(Alice,Charlie). Note that this
event produces knowledge. This is because the agents can verify that the friend request has occurred.
Lastly, at time 15, Charlie accepts Alice’s request and Bob shares a picture at work. Note that these two
events are independent. If they were to be executed sequentially, independently of their order, the final SNM
would always be equal to SN 15. After Bob’s accepting Alice’s request (Alice,Charlie) 6∈ FriendRequestσ [15],
and (Alice,Charlie) ∈ Friendshipσ [15]. That is, Alice cannot send more friend requests to Charlie, and now
they have become friends. Furthermore, both, Alice and Bob know that Bob shared a picture at work. Note
that, in this case, Bob also knows that his location is work. Nevertheless, Alice believes it.2 The reason is
that, unlikely Bob, Alice cannot confirm that Bob’s location is work.
We mentioned that Snapchat messages last for up to 10 seconds. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that all messages
last 10 seconds, i.e., ω = 10. Given that, in σ , Alice remembers Bob picture from 0 to 10. That is,
σ |= ∀t · 0 ≤ t ≤ 10 =⇒ K tAlicepicture
0(Bob, pub)
Similarly, her belief about Bob location, picture0(Bob, pub), vanishes at time 10. Note also that, when Charlie
accepts Alice’s friend request, he still knows (or remembers) that Alice sent it. In Snapchat friend request
are permanent, but in PPF RT we can choose whether friend request disappear after a few seconds. It can
be done by requiring that the agent knows that a friend request occurred in order to accept it. In such a case,
in σ , after time 18 Charlie would not be able to accept Alice’s request.
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of PPF RT main goal is expressing privacy policies. They can be
expressed as a formulae in KBLRT . Let Ag and Locs be domains of agents and locations, respectively.
For the purpose of this example we assume that they do not change and that is why we do not specify the
superindex. Alice, who likes keep her weekends private can write the following policy ∀i :Ag · ∀l : Locs · ∀t ·
weekend(t ) =⇒ (∀t ′ · t ′ > t =⇒ K t
′
i picture
t (Alice, l )). In English it means “Nobody can know Alice
location during the weekend”.
3.3 Model Checking KBLRT
In this section, we show that the model checking problem forKBLRT is decidable.
1We refer the reader to [19] for the definition of operational semantics rules for PPF which describe the behaviour of the events in the
OSN.
2For readability we omit occurred15(enter(B15
Alice
loc15(Bob, work))) in Fig. 3 which is included in EKBσ [15]
Alice
.
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THEOREM 3.12. The model checking problem forKBLRT is decidable.
PROOF. Given a trace σ ∈ WFT , a formula φ ∈ FKBLRT and a windoww . We show that determining
σ |= φ is decidable by providing a naive model checking algorithm which implements the semantics of
KBLRT , adapting the proof for the simpler logic KBLT from [21].
We first expand the universal quantifiers in φ by inductively transforming each subformula ∀x :D · φ ′
and ∀t · φ ′ into a conjunction with one conjunct φ ′[v/x] for each element v in the domain D or Tσ . All
domains—including Tσ—are finite. The resulting formula is quantifier free and has sizeO(|φ |×dq ) where d
is a bound on the size of the domain and q is the maximum nested stack of quantifiers. Let φ1, . . . ,φm be
the subformulas of the resulting formula, ordered respecting the subformula relation. An easy induction on
k < m shows that we can label every agent and at every step of the trace with either φk or ¬φk . The labelling
proceeds from the earliest time-stamp on. We begin with the atomic part:
• Checking ct
e, f
and at
e, f
can be performed in constant time, simply by checking the model at the
given instant t , for every agent.
• Checking pt ( #»s ) at a given instant t requires one query to the epistemic reasoning engine for EKBσ [t ]e
(for the environment agent e and time stamp t).
• Checking occurredt (e) can be performed in constant time by checking the set of events e ∈ E of σ
at time t .
Then, for the epistemic part we first resolve all operators:
• Checking ψk = ¬ψj and ψk = ψj ∧ ψi can be done in constant time for each instant t and agent i,
using the induction hypothesis.
• First, we construct a set ∆ where we instantiate all the axioms in Table 1 for each t ∈ Tσ . The result-
ing set has size |∆|= |Tσ |×11 (number of axioms in Table 1). Secondly, we instantiate KR1 (cf. Ta-
ble 1), forw and for all t , t ′ ∈ Tσ such that t > t ′ and t −t ′ < w . The resulting set of axioms has size
O(
∑ |Tσ |−1
n=1 n×w). That is, all legal combinations of timestamps (n) times the window size (w). These
axioms are also included in ∆, which, consequently, contains a finite set of axioms. Finally, checking
K tiψj and B
t
iψj require one query dkd to the epistemic engine for ∆,
⋃
{t ′ |t ′<t ∈Tσ } EKB
σ [t ]
i ⊢ ψj . The
previous query is equivalent to model checking a Kripke structure where relations are labelled with
triples (i, t ,w). Solving this problem is known to be in PSPACE [10].
It is easy to see that the semantics of KBLRT is captured by this algorithm. 
3.4 Properties of the framework
In this section we present interesting properties of our framework, together with a set of novel derived
operators not present in traditional epistemic logics.
To Learn or not to learn; To believe or not to believe. InKBLT we introduced the learning modality Liφ
[21]. It stands for i learnt φ at a moment t when the formula is being evaluated. Here Liφ, or more precisely,
Ltiφ becomes a derived operator.
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We say that an agent has learnt φ at time t , if she knowsφ at time t but she did not know it for any previous
timestamp. Formally, we define it in terms of K ti φ as follows
Ltiφ , ¬K
pred(t )
i φ ∧ K
t
i φ.
We can also model when users start to believe something, or accept a belief. To model this concept we define
the acceptance operator. As before, it can be expressed using Bti
Atiφ , ¬B
pred(t )
i φ ∧ B
t
iφ.
Analogously we can express when users forget some knowledge or when they reject a belief. Intuitively,
an agent forgets φ at time t if she knew it in the previous timestamp, i.e., pred(t )—recall the definition of
pred in Section 3.2.2—and in t she does not know φ, and, analogously, for reject. Formally,
F ti φ , K
pred(t )
i φ ∧ ¬K
t
i φ
Rtiφ , B
pred(t )
i φ ∧ ¬B
t
iφ.
Temporal modalities. The traditional temporal modalities ✷ and✸ can easily be defined using quantifica-
tion over timestamps as follows:
✷φ(t ) , ∀t · φ(t )
✸φ(t ) , ∃t · φ(t )
where φ(t ) is a formula φ which depends on t .
How long do agents remember? Agents remember according to the length of the parameter ω. It can be
seen as the size of their memory. Intuitively, increasing agents memory could only increase her knowledge.
We prove this property in the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.13 (INCREASING WINDOW AND KNOWLEDGE). Given σ , t ∈ σ and w,w ′ ∈ N where w ≤
w ′.
If EKB
σ [t ]
i ⊢ (K
t
i φ,w), then EKB
σ [t ]
i ⊢ (K
t
i φ,w
′).
PROOF. Assume EKBσ [t ]i ⊢ (K
t
i φ,w). By Definition 3.6, there exists a derivation (φ1,w1) (φ2,w2) . . . (φn,wn)
for n ∈ N such that (φn ,wn) = (φ,w). Let α = w ′ −w , sincew ≤ w ′ it follows that α ≥ 0.
Consider now the following derivation where the same deduction rules as in the previous derivation has
been applied, and α is added to each wi , (φ1,w1 + α ) (φ2,w2 + α ) . . . (φn ,wn + α ). We show now that, if
(φ1,w1) (φ2,w2) using a deduction rule R then (φ1,w1 + α ) (φ2,w2 + α ) can also be derived using R, for all R
in Table 2. We split the proof in derivation rules which, copy, reduce or introducew .
• Rules that copy w . These are, A2, A3, A4, A5, K, B4, B5, L1 and L2. If w ∈ N given that α ≥ 0
it trivially follows that w + α ∈ N which complies with the conditions of any of these rules. In this
case w = w ′ therefore the same applies tow ′.
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• Rules that reducew . This is, KR1. In this casew < w ′. In order for the derivation to be correct both
w and w ′ are in N. Since α ∈ N, it follows that w + α and w ′ + α are in N. Moreover, since α is a
constant it also follows thatw −w ′ = (w + α ) − (w ′ + α ). From the previous statement we conclude
that the same window increase is required and, therefore the same derivation is performed.
• Rules that introducew . These are, A1, D and Premise. No conditions are imposed in the value ofw
in order to apply these rules. Therefore, if they can be applied with windoww since α ≥ 0 they can
also be applied with windoww + α .

We can characterise how long agents remember information depending on the parameters ω and β of
the framework. We differentiate for how long agents remember knowledge or beliefs since the parameter β
might influence it.
LEMMA 3.14 (ω KNOWLEDGE MONOTONICITY). Given σ and t ∈ Tσ . If K ti φ ∈ EKB
σ [t ]
i then for all
t ′ ∈ Tσ such that t ≤ t
′ ≤ t + ω it holds σ |= K t
′
i φ. 
PROOF. Assume K ti φ ∈ EKB
σ [t ]
i . By premise we can derive (K
t
i φ, 0). Let t
′ = t + ω, by applying KR1 we
can derive (K t
′
i φ,ω). By |= we conclude σ |= K
t ′
i φ. Given the above and by Lemma 3.13, for all t ≤ t
′′ < t +ω
it always possible to derive (K t
′′
i φ,ω). 
This parameter give us a lot of flexibility in modelling agents memories. By choosing ω = ∞ we can
model agents with perfect recall, i.e, agents that never forget. On the other hand, we can also use ω = 0, i.e.,
agents who do not remember anything.
When β = conservative, memories about beliefs behave in the same way as knowledge. Similarly mono-
tonicity results can be proven for beliefs as the lemmas above. For example, if β = conservative then beliefs
are preserved until either forgotten—due to ω—or to contradictory knowledge. Similarly, if β = susceptible,
susceptible agents can reject a belief when exposed to new contradictory beliefs. Therefore, the duration of
their beliefs can be limited by an event introducing new beliefs in the EKBs. Other versions of β are possible,
for example based on the reputation of the agent that emits the information. It is also possible to consider
different ω for different pieces of information.
4 WRITING PRIVACY POLICIES
In this section we provide a language for writing privacy polices, PPLRT . In a nutshell PPLRT is a
restricted version of KBLRT wrapped with J Ksi to indicate the owner of the policy i and its starting time s.
Definition 4.1 (Syntax ofPPLRT ). Given agentsa,b ∈ Ag, a nonempty set of agentsG ⊆ Ag, timestamps
s, t , a variable x , predicate symbols ctm (a,b),a
t
n(a,b), p
t ( #»s ), and a formula φ ∈ FKBLRT , the syntax of the
real-time privacy policy language PPLRT is inductively defined as:
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σ |=C ∀x .δ iff for all v ∈ Do , σ |=C δ[v/x]
σ |=C J¬αK
s
i
iff σ |= ¬α
σ |=C Jφ =⇒ ¬αK
s
i
iff σ |= φ =⇒ ¬α
Fig. 4. Conformance relation for PPLRT
δ ::= δ ∧ δ | ∀x .δ | J¬αKs
i
| Jφ =⇒ ¬αKs
i
α ::= α ∧ α | ∀x .α | ∃x .α | ψ | γ ′
ψ ::= ctm (a,b) | a
t
n(a,b) | occurred
t (e)
γ ′ ::= K ti γ | B
t
iγ
γ ::= γ ∧ γ | ¬γ | pt ( #»s ) | γ ′ | ψ | ∀x .γ
We will use FPPLRT to denote the set of all privacy policies created according to the previous defini-
tion. To determine whether a policy is violated in an evolving social network, we formalise the notion of
conformance for PPLRT .
Definition 4.2 (Conformance Relation). Given a well-formed trace σ ∈ TCS, a variable x , a timestamp s,
and an agent i ∈ Ag, the conformance relation |=C is defined as shown in Fig. 4.
The definition is quite simple, especially compared to that of conformance of PPLT [21]. If the policy
is quantified, we substitute in the usual way. The main body of the policy in double brackets is dealt with by
simply delegating to the satisfaction relation.
4.0.1 Examples.
Example 4.3. Assume Alice decides to hide all her weekend locations from her supervisor Bob. She has
a number of options how to achieve this, depending on what the precise meaning of the policy should be.
If the idea she has is to restrict Bob learning her weekend location directly when she posts it, she can
define
δ1 = ∀t · Jweekend(t ) =⇒ ¬K
t
Boblocation(Alice, t )K
2016-04-16
Alice
where the weekend predicate is true if the timestamp supplied represents a time during a weekend. This
policy can be read as “if x is a time instant during a weekend, then Bob is not allowed to learn at x Alice’s
location from time x”.
This, however, is a very specialized scenario that captures only a small number of situations. Bob is,
for example, free to learn Alice’s location at any point not during the weekend, or at any point during the
weekend when Alice’s location is no longer up-to-date. Though there might be scenarios where this might
be the desired behavior, we can define a policy that seems much closer to the intuitive meaning of learning
someone’s location on a weekend. Consider
δ2 = ∀t · Jweekend(t ) =⇒ ¬∃t
′ · (K t
′
Boblocation(Alice, t))K
2016-04-16
Alice
.
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Here, Bob is not allowed to learn Alice’s location from a weekend, no matter when. If the policy does not
get violated, then Alice’s weekend locations will be completely safe from Bob – on the social network, at
least.
Example 4.4. One of the advantages of PPLRT is the ability to distinguish between the original time of
a piece of information and the time when it should be hidden. Suppose Diane activates the following policy:
δ1 = ∀t · ∀x :Ag
t · J¬friendst (Diane, x ) =⇒ ¬∃t ′ · (K txpost
t ′ (Diane))K2016-05-28
Diane
This aims to prevent anyone who is not a friend of Diane’s from learning any of her posts (here we assume
that the friends connection is not reflexive for simplicity, otherwise the restriction would target Diane herself,
too).
Though δ1 may seem reasonable enough, it might be unnecessarily restrictive. Let us say there is another
user, Ethan. Diane becomes friends with Ethan on May 31, so when her policy is already in effect. Should
Ethan be able to learn about Diane’s posts from when they were not friends? Not according to δ1, which says
that no one, regardless of their relationship with Diane at the moment, is able to learn about her posts from
when they were not friends.
Note that while this may indeed be the desired behaviour, it is, for example, not what happens on Facebook,
where when two users become friends, they are free to access each other’s timeline including past events and
posts. PPLRT is expressive enough to model this behaviour as well. We can define:
δ2 = ∀t · ∀t
′ · ∀x :Agt J¬friendst (Diane, x ) ∧ ¬friendst
′
(Diane, x ) =⇒ ¬K t
′
x post
t (Diane)K2016-05-28
Diane
This policy precisely defines the point in time from when to hide information, y, as well as the point
in time when to hide it, y′. It says, “if Diane is not friend with someone, then that someone cannot learn
her posts, but only if they come from a time when they were not friends”. Note that δ2 says nothing about
users who are currently friends of Diane’s, which is different from δ1 – here her friends can learn anything,
including past posts from when they were not friends with her.
Since checking conformance of PPLRT privacy policies reduces to model checking the given trace the
following corollary follows directly from Theorem 3.12.
COROLLARY 4.5. Checking conformance of PPLRT policies is decidable.
5 RELATED WORK
Specifying and reasoning about temporal properties in multi-agent systems using epistemic logic have been
previously studied in a number of papers (e.g., in [10] for interpreted systems; see also [21] and references
therein). More recently, Moses et al. have extended interpreted systems to enhance reasoning about past and
future knowledge. In [6] they extend Ki with a time-stamp Ki,t , allowing for the expression of properties
such as “Alice knows at time 10 that Bob knew p at time 1”, i.e., KAlice,10KBob,1 p. Thought there are some
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similarities between the work by Moses et al. and ours, namely the use of time-stamps in the knowledge
modality and the moving along a trace to place the evaluation in the “right” place, there are quite a few
differences. First, we differ in the intended use of the logics: Moses et al. use time to model delays in
protocols, whereas our main motivation is to provide a rich privacy policy language for OSNs. Besides, our
logic includes belief and other operators not present in the timed versions introduced by them, and we have
time-stamps associated with propositions. We claim, however, that KBLRT as at least as expressive as the
logics introduced by Moses et al. , though this would need to be formally proved and for that we would need
to relate our (non-standard) semantics with interpreted systems. This is left as future work.
Actions have also been taken into account in reasoning about believes and time. For example, [27] presents
a logic for reasoning about actions and time. The logic includes a belief modality, actions and time-stamps
for atoms, modalities and actions. In our work we do not focus on reasoning about action and time but
on defining dynamic privacy policies for OSNs. In particular, our policies do not include reasoning about
actions. Also, [27] cannot reason about knowledge. Recently, Xiong et al. [29] presented a logic to reason
about belief propagation in Twitter. The logic includes an (untimed) belief modality and actions, which are
used in a dynamic logic fashion. Their models are similar to our untimed SNMs [20, 22]. Even though we
do not include actions, we use time-stamps and knowledge modalities. Also, one of the main contributions
of our paper is solving inconsistent beliefs.
As mentioned in the introduction, our work solves the open issues and limitations described in our previ-
ous work [21]. In that paper we introduced PPFT, a temporal epistemic framework for describing policies
for OSNs. PPFT relies on the temporal epistemic logic KBLT that allows to express temporal constraints
using the classical box and diamond temporal operators. Neither the policy language nor the underlying
logic KBLT have a notion of time: this is only used at the semantic level, allowing to move along a social
network model trace in order to interpret the temporal operators. PPF RT strictly extends PPFT, so our
work not only addressed the already identified limitations identified in [21] but also extends that work by
allowing the definition of more modalities (e.g., forget, accept, belief) allowing for a more expressive policy
language and underlying logic. These allow us to define policies for more complex OSNs, like Snapchat.
Besides the above, it is worth mentioning the work by Woz´na & Lomuscio [28] where TCTLKD s pre-
sented. TCTLKD is a combination of epistemic logic, CTL, a deontic modality and real time. It is difficult
to compare our logic KBLRT with TCTLKD as they use CTL, while we have time-stamps in the propo-
sitions. The models used to interpret formulae in TCTLKD are based on a semantics for a branching logic,
being a combination of timed automata and interpreted systems plus an equivalence relation for modelling
permission. Ours is based on (timed) social network models. Besides we can also reason about belief.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a novel privacy policy framework based on a logic that offers explicitly
support for expressing timestamps in events and epistemic operators. This framework extends [18, 22], which
did not offer any support for time, and [21] which only had limited support due to the implicit treatment of
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time. Our framework is based on Extended Knowledge Bases. A query to an EKB starts by instantiating
a number of epistemic axioms that handle knowledge, belief and time (the concrete axioms depend on
the OSN instantiation). The deductive proof system give an algorithm to deduce the knowledge of agents
acquired at each instant, and in turn a model checking algorithm for the logic and a check for privacy
policy violations. The explicit time-stamps allow to define learning and forget operators that capture when
knowledge is acquired. Similarly, one can derive accept and reject operators that model when beliefs come
into existence and are rejected.
The flexibility of the EKBs allows to model different kinds of OSNs in terms of how the actions affect
knowledge and how this knowledge is preserved through time. For instance, we can define eternal OSNs like
Facebook and ephemeral OSNs like Snapchat.
Two important avenues for future research are the following. First, many instantiations enable efficient
implementations of checking privacy policy violations by exploitingwhether events can affect the knowledge
of the agents involved. Once the effect of the actions is fixed one can prove that a distributed algorithm
guarantees the same outcome as the centralized algorithm proposed here. For example, tweets can only
affect the knowledge of subscribers so all other users are unaffected. Second, once an effective system to
check policy violations is in place, there are different possibilities that the OSN can offer. One is to enforce
the policy by forbidding the action that the last agent executed, which would lead to the violation. Another
can be the analysis of the trace to assign blame (and correspondingly, reputation) to the agents involved
in the chain of actions. For example, the creator of a gossip or fake news may be held more responsible
than users forwarding them. Even a finer analysis of controllability can give more powerful algorithms by
detecting which agents could have prevented the information flow that lead to the violation. Finally, yet
another possibility would be to remove past events from the history trace of the OSN creating a pruned trace
with no violation. All these possibilities are enabled by having a formal framework like the one presented in
this paper.
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